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" U N C A U S E D B E G I N N I N G S " R E V I S I T E D 
Graham Oppy 
William Lane Craig's "Reflections on 'Uncaused Beginnings" is a sustained 
critique of my "Uncaused Beginnings." 1 argue that the central arguments of 
my essay survive that critique unscathed. When we make a fair and accurate 
comparison of naturalist and theist claims about global causal reality, we see 
that considerations about causation and the shape of causal reality do not 
decide between naturalism and theism. Moreover, the Edwards/Prior/Craig 
objection does not rule out the view that there is an initial global causal state 
involving none but contingently existing entities. 
1 
Compare two views about global causal reality. Both views suppose that 
there is a contingent initial global causal state involving at least one neces-
sarily existent entity. Both views suppose that the initial global causal state 
is the only global causal state that has no cause; both views also suppose 
that the only further causal states that have no cause are initial states of en-
tities that belong to and/or are sub-states of the initial global causal state. 
One view is naturalistic. This view says that global causal reality is the 
causal evolution of an entirely natural, necessarily existent entity: the 
universe (or multiverse, or what have you). The initial global causal state 
is the initial state of the universe; all subsequent global causal states are 
subsequent causal states of the universe, arrived at by a process of causal 
evolution f rom the initial state of the universe. 
The other view is theistic. This view says that global causal reality is 
the causal evolution of a partly supernatural system which contains both 
a necessarily existing creator God, and a contingently existing natural 
entity: the universe (or multiverse, or what have you). The initial global 
causal state is the initial state of G o d (prior to creation); subsequent to 
creation, global causal states are states of a system that includes both G o d 
and the universe, arrived at by a process of causal evolution f rom the ini¬
tial state of the system. 
Both views share the following thesis about modality: all possible worlds 
begin with an initial state of the very same entity, and that initial state is 
brutely contingent. O n the theistic view, the entity in question is God: 
every possible wor ld begins with God, but the creative dispositions with 
which G o d is equipped are brutely contingent—there is no explanation, in 
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any possible world, why G o d has the creative dispositions that G o d has 
in that world, rather than other creative dispositions that G o d might have 
had instead. O n the naturalistic view, the entity in question is the universe: 
every possible world begins with an initial state of the universe, but the 
initial properties of the universe which govern its subsequent evolution are 
brutely contingent—there is no explanation, in any possible world, why 
the universe has the initial properties that it does, rather than other initial 
properties that it might have had instead. 
Both views come in deterministic and non-deterministic versions. O n 
deterministic versions of these views, the causal evolution of the state of 
global causal reality is deterministic; on non-deterministic versions of 
these views, the causal evolution of the state of global causal reality—and 
of entities that belong to and/or are sub-states of global causal reality— 
is (at least somewhere) chancy. O n either version, there is no non-initial 
point at which there is entirely uncaused evolution of state: there is no 
non-initial point at which entities "pop into existence uncaused." More-
over, it is a matter for semantic decision whether we say, on each view, that 
any entity that exists in the initial state "pops into existence uncaused": 
we could define "pops into existence" in such a way that both G o d (on the 
theist view) and the universe (on the naturalist view) pop into existence 
uncaused; or we could define "pops into existence" i n such a way that 
neither G o d (on the theist view) nor the universe (on the naturalist view) 
pops into existence uncaused. 
There are, of course, many variants of both views. We might suppose 
that there is no initial state, but rather an infinite regress. We might sup¬
pose that the initial state is necessary. We might suppose that the entities 
that exist in the initial state are contingent, and that there might have been 
nothing. We might suppose that the entities that exist in the initial state 
are contingent, and that there might have been different initial entities. 
A n d so forth. 
2 
Wil l i am Lane Craig's "Reflections on 'Uncaused Beginnings" 1 is committed 
to the theistic view that 1 identified initially. By contrast, I'm undecided be-
tween a range of naturalistic views: the naturalistic view that 1 identified 
initially, the variant of that view on which the initial state is necessary, the 
variant of that view in which there is an infinite regress; and perhaps other 
views besides. 1f forced to choose, 1 would probably opt for the variant of 
the view on which the initial state is necessary, though not with any de¬
gree of confidence. However, 1 deny that 1 need to choose in order to have 
reason to prefer naturalism to theism: for, by my lights, on each variant of 
the two views, the naturalist account is preferable to the theist account. 
1 W i l l i a m Craig , "Reflections on 'Uncaused Beginnings, '" Faith and Philosophy 27 (2010), 
72-78. 
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1f we compare the two views that 1 identified initially, then it seems to 
me obvious that these two views are tied when it comes to considerations 
about causation and the structure of (global) causal reality. However, it ap¬
pears that Craig disagrees. He claims, for example, (a) that the naturalist 
v iew just assumes that things which feature in an initial state of reality 
must be capable of persisting (75); and (b) that it is just ad hoc conjecture, 
on the part of the naturalist view, to suppose that all possible worlds have 
an initial state constituted entirely by the contingent state of a necessarily 
existing entity (76); and (c) that the naturalist v iew involves a conflation 
of causal order wi th temporal order (72); and (d) that the naturalist v iew 
rules out simultaneous causation (73); and (e) that the naturalist v iew 
fails because temporal becoming is an objective feature of reality (74). 
O n the contrary, it seems to me that there is obvious parity between the 
two views wi th respect to all of these claims: if the naturalist v iew "just 
assumes" that things which feature in an initial state of reality must be ca¬
pable of persisting, then so does the theist view; if is just ad hoc conjecture 
for the naturalist to suppose that all possible worlds have an initial state 
constituted entirely by the contingent state of a necessarily existing entity, 
then it is equally ad hoc conjecture for the theist to make this supposition; 
if the naturalist v iew involves a conflation of causal order wi th temporal 
order, then so does the theist view; if the naturalist v iew rules out simul¬
taneous causation, then so does the theist view; if the naturalist v iew fails 
because temporal becoming is an objective feature of reality, then so does 
the theist view. 
A referee for this journal suggested that the naturalist v iew falls behind 
the theistic view because it involves rejection of plausible modal recombi¬
nation principles. But here, too, it seems obvious to me that there is parity. 
1f we suppose that there is a contingent initial state involving a necessarily 
existent entity, then the nature and existence of that necessarily existent 
entity imposes restrictions on whatever modal recombination principles 
there may be. 1n particular, given that there is this necessarily existent 
entity, it is impossible that there are worlds in which there are none but 
contingently existing entities; and it is impossible that there are worlds 
in which there is nothing that instantiates the essential properties of the 
necessarily existing entity. 
3 
The main arguments in my "Uncaused Beginnings" 2 are concerned with a 
particular objection to the view which has it that the initial state involves 
none but contingently existing entities. This objection—the Edwards/Prior/ 
Craig objection—claims that if you deny that it is possible for a raging 
tiger to "suddenly come into existence uncaused out of nothing" in the 
room in which you are reading this article, then you cannot consistently 
2 Graham Oppy, "Uncaused Beginnings," Faith and Philosophy 27 (2010), 61-71. 
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allow that it is possible for the initial state of reality to "suddenly come 
into existence uncaused out of nothing." 
1n "Uncaused Beginnings," 1 argued that this claim is false. There is 
independent reason to think that, whether or not it is possible for the 
initial state of reality to "suddenly come into existence uncaused out of 
nothing," it is impossible for a raging tiger to "suddenly come into ex¬
istence uncaused out of nothing" i n the room in which you are reading 
this article. 1n particular, 1 argued, it is impossible for a raging tiger to 
"suddenly come into existence uncaused out of nothing" in the room in 
which you are reading this article because there is no place i n the room 
in which you are reading this article that a tiger could come to occupy 
uncaused. O n my view, a thing that does not exist cannot bring about the 
non-existence of something that does exist; and a natural entity cannot 
exist except as an occupant of a location in the manifold of natural reality. 
1n the causal order, the displacing activity of the displacing object—the 
object "popping into existence"—would have to be both (causally) prior 
to the displacement of the displaced object (in order to cause the displace¬
ment) and (causally) posterior to the displacement of the displaced object 
(in order that the displacing object exists and hence is able to bring about 
the displacement). But that's impossible: it cannot be that the displacing 
activity of the displacing object is both (causally) prior to and (causally) 
posterior to the displacement of the displacing object. 
Craig finds my view "perverse." He says: "1n the causal order, the new 
object's coming into being at some place causes the former occupant to 
vacate the space" (76). As 1 have just argued, if there is a view here that 
is "perverse" it is Craig's, since his view would have non-existent objects 
making a causal contribution to their own coming into existence. 
1 also argue that, if—per impossible—something d id "pop into existence" 
at a particular location, we would properly regard the vacation of the space 
now occupied by the thing that comes into existence by the thing(s) that 
previously occupied that space as a cause—i.e., a necessary causal condi-
tion—of the existence of the new occupant of that space. Thus, even in this 
case, we would not have something popping into existence uncaused. 
About this case, Craig comments: 
on Oppy's view the current occupant's vacating the space causes the new 
object to come into being, which is clearly wrong-headed. 1ndeed, on Oppy's 
view, we are left wondering w h y an object of precisely the same shape and 
size d id not come into being as a result of the evacuation of a certain spatial 
region by an object. W h y wou ld the movement of a table cause a tiger to pop 
into being? (77) 
1 do not accept this. Given that the table is not tiger-shaped, the mere "pop¬
ping out of existence" of the table would not create a space into which 
a tiger could fit. What is needed for that is an appropriate tiger-shaped 
space. 1n order to make such a space overlapping where the table now is, 
the table would have to go: but, on its own, the "popping out of existence" 
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of the table would not even suffice for the creation of an appropriate tiger-
shaped space, let along for the "popping into existence" of a tiger. 
1n truth, 1 no more think that things can "pop out of existence within 
natural reality" uncaused than 1 think that things can "pop into existence 
within natural reality" uncaused. M y central argument is independent of 
my further argument for the claim that, if it were possible for things to 
"pop into existence within natural reality" and to "pop out of existence 
within natural reality," then "poppings into existence" wou ld always have 
"poppings out of existence" as causes. 
4 
There is a second string to the Edwards/Prior/Craig objection. 1t claims 
that, if you hold that it is possible for the initial state of reality to "sud¬
denly come into existence uncaused out of nothing," then you cannot 
consistently deny that it might have been hydrogen atoms or rabbits that 
"sprang spontaneously f rom the void." 
1n "Uncaused Beginnings," 1 suggested that anyone who supposes that 
it is possible for the initial state of reality to "suddenly come into existence 
uncaused out of nothing" should further maintain: (a) that a contingent 
initial state of reality and the contingent things that feature therein are the 
only kinds of contingent things that can have no cause; (b) that anything 
that is or can be a contingent initial state of reality cannot be anything 
other than a contingent initial state of reality; (c) that anything that is or 
can be a non-initial state of reality cannot be anything other than a non-
initial state of reality; (d) that anything that features in a contingent initial 
state of reality can only come into existence as a feature of a contingent 
initial state of reality; and (e) that anything that comes into existence as a 
feature of a non-initial state of reality can only come into existence as a fea¬
ture of a non-initial state of reality. Moreover, 1 suggested that a naturalist 
who supposes that it is possible for the initial state of reality to "suddenly 
come into existence uncaused out of nothing" should maintain: (f) that 
the only thing that can exist unaccompanied is natural reality; (g) that the 
only uncaused state that natural reality can have is its initial state; (h) that 
the only things that have no cause of their existence are things that are 
present in the initial state of natural reality; and (i) that the only states of 
things that have no cause of their obtaining are states that things have in 
the initial state of natural reality. 
Craig says that these claims are "simply fantastic" and "explanatorily 
vacuous" (75). However, it seems to me that he is, himself, committed to 
a very similar bunch of claims: (a) the contingent initial state of reality 
and the necessarily existent G o d that features therein are the only kinds 
of things that can have no cause; (b) anything that is or can be an initial 
state of reality cannot be anything other than an initial state of reality; (c) 
anything that is or can be a non-initial state of reality cannot be anything 
other than a non-initial state of reality; (d) anything that features in an 
initial state of reality cannot come into existence in a non-initial state of 
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reality; (e) anything that comes into existence as a feature of a non-initial 
state of reality can only come into existence as a feature of a non-initial 
state of reality; (f) G o d is the only thing that can exist unaccompanied 
in causal reality; (g) the only uncaused state of causal reality is its initial 
state; (h) the only thing that has no cause of its existence is the thing (God) 
that is present in the initial state of causal reality; (i) the only state of things 
that has no cause of their obtaining is the state of G o d i n the initial causal 
state of reality. 
1n my view, in order to decide between the competing views here, we 
need to weigh their theoretical virtues. Which view makes the best trade¬
off between (a) minimising ontological and ideological commitments and 
(b) maximising explanation of data? 1f it turns out that views according to 
which there is a contingent initial state of global causal reality involving 
none but contingently existing entities do worse than competing views— 
e.g., views according to which there is a necessary initial state of global 
causal reality involving none but necessarily existing entities, and views 
according to which there is a contingent initial state involving none but 
necessarily existing entities, and views according to which there is an 
infinite regress of causal states—when it comes to managing the trade-
off between minimising ontological and ideological commitments and 
maximising explanation of data, then there is good reason to reject views 
according to which there is a contingent initial state of global causal reality 
involving none but contingently existing entities. But we cannot discern 
that views according to which there is a contingent initial state of global 
causal reality involving none but contingently existing entities do worse 
than competing views on that trade-off merely by inspecting the kinds of 
principles mentioned i n the preceding two paragraphs. 1nstead, we must 
determine the ontological and ideological commitments of the competing 
views, and we must make a careful scrutiny of exactly how the relevant 
data is explained by the competing views. While 1 think that we can see 
that naturalistic theories fare better than their theistic correlates under 
this assessment, 1 am sceptical that we can properly weigh the competing 
naturalist theories (hence my indecision about which naturalist view 
to accept).3 
3 For further discussion of the weighing of naturalism and theism, see: Graham Oppy, 
"Craig's Ka lam Cosmology," Philo 12 (2009), 200-216; Graham Oppy, "The Shape of Causal 
Reality," Philosophia Christi 12 (2010), 273-280; Graham Oppy, "O'Connor 's Cosmological 
Argument ," Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 3 (2011), 166-186; Graham Oppy, " G o d " 
in N . Manson and R. Barnard, eds., The Continuum Companion to Metaphysics (New York: 
Cont inuum, 2012), 245-267; Graham Oppy, "Ultimate Naturalistic Casual Explanations," in 
T. Goldschmidt, ed., The Puzzle of Existence (New York: Routledge, 2013), 46-63; and Graham 
Oppy, The Best Argument against God (Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2013). 
